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Abstract: This paper examines the garment industry in Malaysia from the 1970s to the present.
It looks at the strategies employed by manufacturers to cope with both the end of the Multifibre Arrangement (MFA) and the effects of the global economic crisis on the industry in
Malaysia. The garment industry in Malaysia is situated on the periphery and is almost totally
reliant on contracts from the United States (US) and Europe for its survival. Since the global
economic recession, contraction in the consumption of garments in these countries has
translated into factory closures and lay-offs in Malaysia. According to industry experts, the
apparel sector is no longer competitive and unless manufacturers increase levels of technology
the industry will struggle to survive. Trade associations in Malaysia and ASEAN countries
argue that a regional strategy is necessary to cope with increasing levels of competition from
China and other parts of the world.
Keywords: economic crisis, export manufacturing, foreign workers, global commodity chains,
Malaysia
JEL classifications: L22, O14, O19

1.

Introduction

The garment and textile industry in Malaysia faces high levels of competition from countries
in the Asia Pacific region including China. The industry has managed to survive changes
brought about by the end of the Multi-fibre Arrangement (MFA) under the World Trade
Organisation (WTO) by moving up the global commodity chain to manufacture for the highend sportswear market. However the global economic crisis (GEC) has brought new
challenges to managers as the contraction in consumption in Europe and the US means
reduced orders, factory closures and re-locations. In response, the Malaysian government has
provided a package to lower the costs of industry imports to help manufacturers cope with the
recession.1 This is not the first time the government has stepped in to support the export
industry.
The government has played a major role in promoting export-oriented manufacturing in
the clothing, textile and electronic sectors and for connecting the economy to the global
market in order to fast-track development (Rasiah, 1993). The government in Malaysia
(following a development trajectory) embarked on a New Economic Policy (NEP) in 1971
that would eradicate Malay poverty and prevent ethnic tensions between Malays and nonMalays after emotionally charged riots occurred in 1969. Consequently the manufacturing
1

sector prospered. This was particularly the case for the electronics sector and the textile and
garment sectors and by the 1990s these accounted for 45 per cent of the Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) and 82 per cent of total exports (Athukorala and Menon, 2008: 248). Malaysia
had great success with export manufacturing and in attracting Foreign Direct Investment
(FDI) and until the AFC in 1997-8 Malaysia was one of the fastest growing economies in the
region. On the other hand, the AFC highlighted the growing income disparity and weaknesses
associated with particular economic policies reliant on FDI and the export market (Ishak,
2000: 113). Although Malaysia recovered more quickly than other nations in the region, the
focus on a large export industry in manufactured goods has not had long term benefits (Jomo,
2001).
Times have changed, but in the 1970s non-Malay ownership was a major problem for the
newly industrialising Malaysia. The focus on enticing foreign direct investment into the
export industry was to provide the state with time to cultivate Malay entrepreneurs (Gomez,
2009). By the 1980s the government favoured joint ventures with Malays and overseas
interests as opposed to import-substitution ventures (Gomez, 2009: 368-70). While nonMalay small to medium enterprises (SMEs) had the capacity to foster domestically driven
industrialisation, the political and social situation in Malaysia was not conducive to nonMalay capitalist development, hence the industry remained almost entirely export focussed.
The globalisation of the garment industry in Malaysia then has a diversity of historical factors
associated with development.
Taking historical factors into account, this article examines the export oriented garment
industry in Malaysia in the post MFA and post GEC period. The globalisation of the garment
industry has been examined through the lens of global commodity chain (GCC) studies.2 In
this literature there are two chains – the producer driven chain and the buyer driven chain.
According to Gereffi et al. (2005) the clothing industry is a buyer driven chain. Brand name
designers and retailers source garments along a commodity chain that extends from the
design and marketing of the garments to fabric sourcing and manufacturing, and then to the
selling of the garments. The GCC analyses include both forward as well as backward
linkages. The business units may be subsidiaries of transnational corporations or independent
companies of varying size (Gereffi and Korzeniewicz, 1995). In the buyer driven chain, the
fundamental premise is that competition is lower in the core nodes while innovation is higher.
This transfers the pressure of competition toward the periphery while captivating profitproducing advances in the core. The buyer is the most powerful node in the chain and the
least powerful node is in the periphery.
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The GCC can be used first, as a lens to show the role of the clothing sector as a stepping
stone in the industrialisation of developing countries and to show how industrial upgrading in
developing countries leads to further technological advances for the industry. The benefits of
global commodity chain production for developing countries and workers are enhanced when
levels of innovation, technology and skill are transferred resulting in full package production.
This is more common in countries where manufacturers produce for the high end of the
market. Countries where manufacturers produce for the mass market are more likely to face
fiercer competition and workers in these factories are more likely to experience ‘sweatshop’
conditions. That is not to say that higher end apparel manufacturers do not exploit labour,
they do, but the higher levels of technology mean the workforce is more skilful and they can
bargain with the manufacturers. However, in some nation states capital labour relations are
far more complex.
Second, the GCC can be used as a lens to show how power among actors in the chain
changes over time. One of Gereffi’s assertions regarding buyer driven commodity chains
highlights the chains’ governance structures (Gereffi et al., 2005). The most powerful
manufacturers offer the buyer services, such as pattern making through to full package
production from factory to retail. These manufacturers usually have computer assisted design
(CAD) and computer assisted manufacture (CAM) technology as well as other
technologically advanced machines. They offer niche buyers quick turnaround to compete
with low cost production. The second most powerful manufacturer services retail giants such
as Wal Mart and Liz Claiborne. These manufacturers must have a level of competency to
mass produce, offer low costs and deliver on time. Usually situated in countries such as
China and Bangladesh, they have a large labour force and make profits by economies of
scale, by increasing the number of garments produced efficiently. The cut, make and sew
manufacturers situated at the bottom of the ladder in the low-cost countries have the least
power but they can undercut the market with cheap labour costs. These producers have little
bargaining power and live in fear that the buyer will leave them for a cheaper ‘bottom of the
barrel’ manufacturer – and in many cases they do.
The GCC is a useful lens but has been criticised over time because it privileges the role of
the industry and marginalises the continued importance of state regulation (Whitely, 1996:
419; Dicken et al., 2001: 100). Dicken et al. (2001) and Smakman (2003) look at the role of
globalisation discourses in the contest over government and business policy. They show that
we must take seriously the ways that policy is framed. Further, Dicken et al. (2001) show that
making the ‘global’ a unit of analysis produces problems of scale. The latest published
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collection of articles in Bair’s book on global commodity chains also views major and minor
problems stemming from an analysis using GCC alone and similarly argues that GCC
analysis has neglected to include the role of states in development and industrial upgrading
(Bair, 2009). The role of state policies in Southeast Asian (SEA) development is significant
(Hewison and Rodan, 1997) and must be included in any analysis of the manufacturing
sectors (Pangsapa and Smith, 2008).
Malaysia is a good case study because it has particular political and ethnic differences
compared to other developing countries in the region. This paper argues that while the
Malaysian industry is connected to the global market, the role of government has been
important in promoting export manufacturing in Malaysia by allowing manufacturers to
recruit overseas labour to solve labour shortages and offset rising labour costs instead of
orchestrating industrial upgrading and training workers (Edwards, 1999). While it appears
that the openness of global trade gradually becomes positive as workers are paid higher rates
of pay, in Malaysia employers pressured the government to allow large numbers of foreign
workers into the industry undermining further skilling and wage increases for Malaysian
workers and allowing employers to become dependent on foreign workers (O’Connor, 1993;
Edwards, 1999; Rasiah, 2009).
This article is divided into three parts. The first section begins with a brief history of
industrial development and the quota system. The second examines the industry strategies to
deal with high levels of competition and labour shortages. It questions industrial upgrading
and buyer relationships in the third section and examines trade associations’ new proposed
strategies to deal with increasing levels of global competition in the future.
This article is part of a research project on the clothing industry in the Asia Pacific post
MFA funded by the Australian Research Commission (ARC) and is based on research
centred on the clothing industry in Malaysia conducted between 2006 and 2009. The research
is largely concentrated in Malaysia’s most developed states including Selangor, Penang,
Negeri Sembilan and Johor. A number of interviews were conducted in Batu Pahat, a garment
cluster town in the state of Johor which was established in the 1970s under the guidance of
Taiwanese and Chinese Malaysian connections. Since then the town has attracted
manufacturers and knitting factories and now produces over 40 per cent of Malaysia’s textiles
and garments and houses the Malaysian Knitting Manufacturers Association (MKMA)
(Smakman, 2003). Johor is mostly focussed on knitted garments while Penang, in the north,
is the largest producer of woven fabrics and garments.
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The qualitative research methods included structured and semi structured interviews and
open-ended answers with managers and market managers of five textile factories including
the three largest companies in Malaysia: Penfabric/Toray (a Japanese company); Recron (a
Taiwanese company taken over by the Reliance Group an Indian company); and Ramatex (a
Malaysian listed company). In addition, interviews were conducted with twenty five garment
manufacturers, four government personnel and four trade associations’ spokespersons.
Companies selected included fifteen medium to large companies and five small to medium
companies manufacturing for the export market, and five small to medium factories
manufacturing for the local market.3
The division of companies on the basis of size is important because larger manufacturers
are foreign multinational companies or Malaysian Chinese owned publicly-listed companies
that use state-of-the-art technology to produce for global markets. Large to medium
Malaysian owned companies could also own several tiers of vertically organised suppliers
and service niche markets such as Nike. Small to medium enterprises (SME) are more
numerous in number and are almost solely owned by Chinese Malaysians and tend to play an
important role in supporting the larger industries. They produce for both the export and
domestic markets. A detailed assessment of these companies is beyond the work of this
article but most of the factories are owned by Chinese Malaysians or by Singaporean, Hong
Kong or Taiwanese companies. Malays control a very small percentage of the local industry,
manufacturing Malay clothes and government uniforms. The garment industry in Malaysia
can be divided between informal and formal sectors and between local and export industries.
Of these, the largest is the formal export sector (R. Chiang, MKMA 2009, pers. comm., July).

2.

The Past: Malaysia and the Quota System

The MFA, known as the quota system, was imposed on developing countries such as the East
Asian Newly Industrialised countries (NICs) to stop these countries overproducing garments
and flooding the developed economies. The main aim of the MFA was to protect jobs in
developed countries and to give poorer nations the opportunity to ‘kick’ start their economies
with labour intensive manufacturing. The ‘Asian Tigers’, however, circumvented the quota
system by transferring part of the production to lesser developed countries with surplus quota
(Wilson and Wong, 1999). Malaysia was one of the ‘cheaper’ sites to which the industry
moved and was one site for the establishment of Export Processing Zones (EPZs), then
considered the main ‘quick fix’ for attracting foreign investment (Rasiah, 1993).
5

During this time, the buyer-driven global commodity chain established in the late 1980s
became a triangle system whereby buyers in the US and Europe sourced their goods from
Japan and the NICs (Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan) who in turn transferred the
production to lesser developed nations such as Malaysia (Smakman, 2003). It marked a
turning point in garment sub-contracting because the NICs organised themselves to provide a
full package production from many different locations. The brand-name buyers did the design
and marketing of the garments but the full package production was orchestrated by the NICs’
sub-contractors.
Malaysian manufacturers were assured of contracts under the quota system and, according
to industry experts, everyone survived. But the quota system meant that garment
manufacturers only focussed on manufacturing made-up garments – there was no upstream or
textile development. Nevertheless Malaysia did very well under the multi-fibre and bilateral
trade agreements and the industry by the 1990s was the sixth largest contributor to total
earnings from manufactured exports (Crinis et al., 2000). Since the late 1990s, the use of East
Asian intermediaries has been no longer necessary as internet technology and expertise in
skills development in countries such as Malaysia means that most countries do their own full
package production. This meant that the US and Europe could send their design to the factory
and the finished product would be sent to the store for retailing and the middle man was cut
out. Malaysia was guaranteed quotas and subsequent contracts to produce garments for the
US and European fashion markets.
After the MFA ended, industry experts blamed the quota system for distortions in different
countries in terms of upstream and downstream developments, and for causing high levels of
competition between manufacturers (A. Hong 2009, pers. comm., 30 June). Under the quota
system, East Asian companies expanded their apparel capabilities and concentrated on
upgrading their products. Ironically, the quota system forced Hong Kong and other NIC
producers to become first class fabric makers (Glasmeier et al., 1993). The NICs continued to
manage large supply chains, extending from Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore and Taiwan to
China, to the retailer and at the same time sold synthetic fabrics to both developed and
developing countries. But the NICs did not focus on the design and retail of the garments.
According to industry experts such as Andrew Hong, chief Executive Officer of Malaysian
Textile Manufacturing Association (2009, pers. comm., 30 June) countries such as Malaysia
and Thailand (unlike the NICc) did not develop backward linkages. While Indonesia had
some backward linkages it was not at the level of Malaysia and Thailand in the downstream,
and countries such as Vietnam and Cambodia only developed downstream cut, make and sew
6

linkages. Malaysia is weak in the upstream because, under the quota system, buyers did not
want dyeing and finishing – they only wanted to buy finished goods. So for over thirty years,
Malaysia did not invest in the upstream but focussed on providing the finished goods. The
quota system also caused high levels of competition between manufacturers because the
buyer could only buy a certain number of garments in a particular country and if one
manufacturer saw the buyer talking to another manufacturer down the road he perceived that
manufacturer as his competitor. According to Hong (2009, pers. comm., 30 June) during the
MFA period “There was no national interest, only individual companies and profits”.

3.

End of the MFA: Southeast Asian Manufacturers Fear China Takeover

The quota system was phased out in 2004 under the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and
Malaysian manufacturers saw this as a time to increase their output. Many buyers also saw
this as a time when China would absorb a large percentage of the global industry and their
fears were well grounded. Apparel exports had been important to China’s export push in the
1990s, growing from $10.2 billion in 1990 to $36.1 billion in 2000 (Clark and Milberg,
2010). The ending of the MFA in 2005 provided China with new opportunities to increase its
output and as a result China’s garment exports to the US and European markets increased.
On the other hand, according to manufacturers interviewed in 2007 who had factories
operating in China, the quality did not always meet the buyers’ expectations because the
garments were poorly made and wages were increasing at about 10 per cent a year. In other
words, China could supply large cut, make and sew orders but China had problems supplying
high-end niche markets. According to H T Leing (2007, pers. comm., May) when discussing
China and the end of the MFA:
Initially we worried that after the withdrawal China would have better income than us [that the
buyers would go straight to China]. But it depends on what kind of market we are doing. If we are
doing lower-end market then we are quite badly affected. For us we are doing a niche market so
they do consider the quality so apparently our orders were not affected by the MFA.

Another manufacturer Y H Tan (2009 pers. comm., 19 August) explained that many
importers of apparel products who moved to source all their garments in China were now
switching part of their supplies back to the traditional sources in the ASEAN region for two
reasons.
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Firstly the trend of outsourcing manufacturing work to China has slowed due to rising cost of
production such as a higher minimum wage and tight labour supply, especially in the coastal
region. And secondly there is a concern among the international brand-name owners of being too
dependent on a single supplier.

Even Chinese fashion designers outsource to lower-wage south Asian countries because the
cost of doing business in China is increasing (Clark and Milberg, 2010). At the same time
Hong claimed that, “China has many problems. In the beginning all the factories were set up
on prime land but now the government wants to sell the land and move the manufacturers” (A
Hong 2009, pers. comm., 30 June). In addition, many manufacturing companies in China are
producers for NICs and some of these companies are getting bigger than the buyers. In this
case they are not interested in small batch orders for niche markets but prefer to manufacture
for middle-of-the-road designers and discount stores for what is termed ‘economies of scale’,
whereas small niche market designers prefer to be assured of good quality and delivery on
time so they want high end producers. That is not to say that niche market designers do not
manufacture in China, they do and many have found the quality good but, for some, it has not
been successful. As an MTMA spokesperson asserted, “out of ten manufacturers that moved
to China, seven returned to Malaysia crying because of the problems. They prefer to remain
in Malaysia or manufacture in Vietnam and Cambodia” (A Hong 2009, pers. comm., 30
June). On the other hand, many manufacturers are shifting from servicing global brands to
providing clothes for the rapidly increasing Chinese consumer demands (Clark and Milberg,
2010). So China did not turn out to be the threat it was imagined to be because, as in
Malaysia, the Chinese apparel sector is at a crossroads.

4.

Industry Survival Strategies: Foreign Workers and/or Re-location

The following sections are based on interviews with both manufacturers and industry trade
association leaders in Malaysia. It appears from the interview data that Malaysian
manufacturers are in a complex situation. There is very little available Malaysian labour to
fill the needs of the industry and while most large to medium companies can afford to invest
in pattern making technology such as laser cutting systems, SMEs find it difficult to
accumulate capital to invest money into upgrading the technology in their factories. As one
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senior manager A C Boon (2006, pers. comm., May) put it, the industry has two factors
(labour shortages and fabric imports) that need to be addressed before industrial upgrading:
Firstly, in terms of the lead-time, most of our materials are still very dependable from overseas, so
that hinders us from making faster deliveries. Secondly we can have a very sophisticated first class
system, but if we don’t have people working in it, it will fail. This is the weakness that we are
facing. We need people, skilled, knowledgeable labour. So these are our weakness that we have to
find ways to improve.

According to a leading industry manufacturer Y H Tan (2009 pers. comm. 19 August):
A shortage of manpower in the country is stifling the growth of the brand name garment industry.
For example my company has produced a number of new products for the luxury fashion sector
and we could expand production by 30 per cent further but we are constrained by the shortage of
skilled labour. Many of the brand name garment manufacturers in the country dare not commit
themselves to recurring seasonal orders, lest they cannot fulfil them, due to the labour shortage.
The number of people engaged in the apparel and textile manufacturing industry is estimated to be
about 60,000 at present, compared with over 100,000 in the mid-1980s. It is dependent on foreign
workers because locals do not want to take up jobs in the industry.

So, even for manufacturers who invest in technology, a supply of labour is still needed but,
because of strong global competition, manufacturers in Malaysia find it difficult to pay higher
wages to attract locals. Manufacturers have employed two strategies to survive labour
shortages – manufacturers employ foreign workers or they re-locate to cheaper sites. Some do
both. As Hong (2009 pers. comm., June 30) put it:
The industry started as all labour intensive industries begin in the labour intensive sectors such as
garments – not much capital needed to set up a factory but the good news for developing countries
is the large number of employees needed in the industry so it helps countries with employment
problems etc. As the country develops however there is less attention paid to labour intensive
industries and more attention to higher value added industries. At the same time the locals become
more educated and finding labour becomes a problem. The industry then divides into those that
import workers to those that export their manufacturing.

In the early stages of export manufacturing, the increase in the number of factories and the
need for labour prompted the government to encourage young nimble fingered Malay women
9

from the rural areas to work in factories. When Dr Mahathir, Prime Minister for over twenty
years, came to power he embarked on an import-substitution, heavy-industrialisation program
involving building materials and vehicle manufacturing. This shift forced the government to
register foreign workers on short term contracts in the agriculture, construction and forestry
industries. In the 1990s, some two million registered foreign workers were working in these
sectors freeing rural workers to embark on educational pursuits or to work in the expanding
electronic, garment and textile sectors.
It was only a matter of time before labour shortages were registered and wages increased
in the manufacturing sectors. During the late 1990s, garment employers asked permission to
recruit foreign workers. It appears that the openness of global trade and globalisation can
gradually lead to positive outcomes as workers are paid higher rates of pay, but the
availability of transnational labour allows employers to avoid the wage costs associated with
the high levels of competition in the global industry. Employers wanted workers who would
work longer hours and, unlike local workers, did not cost the company family benefits and
superannuation contributions.
Foreign workers from a number of countries have been accommodated in hostels close to
factories in Malaysia. According to Smith and Pun (2006) when discussing dormitory labour
in China, dormitories and hostels facilitate the temporary attachment of labour to the factory
since the foreign workers do not have the same rights as citizens and must have employment
to support temporary residence. The introduction of foreign labour into the Malaysian
garment and textile industry under state regulation has provided manufacturers with a labour
force that can be controlled within individual factories without the longer term build-up of
labour institutions that would lead to better working conditions and labour solidarities.
According to a number of manufacturers, operating establishments overseas in less
developed countries is another way to reduce labour costs. As one interviewee said “This is a
labour intensive job, so we require more labour to work. That’s why we have to go out to
different locations to start the factory there” (H T Leing 2006, pers. comm. May). Others
operate vertical supply chains. One manufacturer maintained contracts with Puma by opening
up a factory in Cambodia where the cost of producing garments is less than it is in Malaysia
and the labour supply is plentiful. Another manufacturer, with Nike as their main buyer,
services the company from a variety of countries – the head factory is in Malaysia and sister
factories are in Sri Lanka and China.
According to one senior manager A C Boon (2006, pers. comm., May) of one large
factory:
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We have factories all over Malaysia, in KL, Selangor, Batu Pahat, but also Cambodia and also
China. In Cambodia we have embroidery and garment making, in China we have only garment
making. In Cambodia we have about 8000 employees in two factories in China we have about 500
employees. The designs and styles are provided by the buyers but we do not alter any of the
designs. What we do is advise on the methods of sewing and production, and we will not alter any
single specification of the buyers, so because we have paper patterning and market planning here,
we can actually communicate with China operations and Cambodia operations, using the internet
connections.

According to another manufacturer N G Seng (2007, pers. comm., 21 November)
This industry is not going to survive long in Malaysia due to the labour cost. So this is why now
we are taking an opportunity to expand our business overseas. China is one of the places we can
move to or India and Sri Lanka.

Adding that:
The main concern to us is the labour cost. That why we are unable to compete with other low cost
labour country. Because during the costing and placing the order the buyer already indicates that
these are the price that they can only commit to. Something like a target price. So sometime
calculating the labour cost we found it very hard to compete. This is our main concern.

The biggest challenges for the industry now are the labour costs and the shortage of
manpower but the only way to deal with these pressures is for manufacturers to move up the
scale to manufacture for the brand name niche market, to invest in own brand manufacturing,
and/or to start a retail business to combat high levels of global competition and offset cheap
labour (Y H Tan 2009, pers. comm. 19 August). Interview data from 2006-9 confirmed that
the industries, especially the large to medium manufacturers, were heavily involved in
producing for the high end sportswear market – three were looking at own brand design and
three had moved into retailing.

5.

The Present: Survivors in a Sunset Industry
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Is the sun going down in Malaysia? Not according to industry experts – not as long as people
continue to wear clothes. The country is still well-regarded for supplying and producing highquality products and has a reputation for complying with environmental and human rights
requirements of buyers (Tan, 2010). According to one very positive manufacturer Y H Tan
(2009, pers. comm. 19 August) with facilities located in Kedah and Penang in Malaysia and
Vietnam:
While some might think that apparel manufacturing in Malaysia is becoming a sunset industry
because of rising labour cost, we feel that Malaysia still provides a very viable site for the
business, as international apparel brand owners still respect local manufacturers because of their
reliability and trustworthiness. This helps to maintain our market share in the apparel
manufacturing business, we expect to increase its 2010 output to 10 million pieces of apparel from
nine million last year. We also expect to produce a higher-value range of apparels this year for
customers largely based in the US. The company derives approximately 85 per cent of its revenue
from sales to the United States, 10 per cent to the European Union (EU), and 5 per cent to the
Asia-Pacific.

As said by another brand name manufacturer B P Lau (2007 pers. comm. May):
Malaysia is very small country so we must be very smart and move away from the big players and
capture the niche market we must avoid a head on collision with the low cost countries, avoid
fighting with Bangladesh we must produce quality value for money and deliver on time.

According to the interview material these are the manufacturers that have remained strong in
the industry. They had the foresight to restructure their operations before the phase-out period
was over (Interviews, manufacturers, 2007-09). In a media report, one manufacturer said that
“Owing to the rising operational costs in the country, garment manufacturers had to invest in
original equipment manufacturing (OEM) or to engage in the production of internationally
known brand apparels or both to generate higher margins and offset production costs” (Tan,
2010).
Another manufacturer reported that he could no longer do business with his usual buyers
as they kept under-cutting his price, “the buyers keep asking can you cut your price but, at
some stage, there is nothing more to cut – now we cannot do business anymore” (Ong Lee
Yong 2007, pers. comm. May). In this competitive environment, manufacturers had to move
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up the ladder to higher brand names and niche markets. On the word of one manufacturer
David K K Lee (2006 pers. comm. May):
Certain brands have come to dominate the market in Malaysia at certain times but as these brands
want cheaper prices there appears to be a shift whereby the company moves to other cheaper
locations and the higher end of the market brand names start to contract in Malaysia. For example
ten years ago Esprit was the buyer of this region, but now they have gone down and Gap has gone
up. But even Gap last year has started to taper off. There are other buyers coming here, companies
like Nike and Adidas. Other brands keep changing according to what the market needs and to what
your workforce is capable of. We do change. Wal Mart, Starlight, Kmart are brands that have gone
so cheap we cannot work with them anymore so we go up the rung to DKNY or Gap.

Another manufacturer, A C Boon (2006, pers. comm., May) stated “we are trying to have a
good partnership with Nike, right now I think they are focussing on the Malaysian factories to
have a centre of excellence, that means the design will be sent direct to our country and we
can cut the material on the spot”.
Others moved into retailing to offset the loss of orders due to increasing levels of
competition: According to H Y Tan (2009 pers. comm., 19 August).
Since 2000 I do my own brands and I sell to the local market. If I can no longer manufacture then I
will be selling. I have been doing my own labels, designing and producing and importing for my
shop. I am franchising a Mango store and as such I must buy their clothes as well. If a country has
a label it is all over the world, things have taken on a global movement and we must adapt or else
go out of business. In 2000 my export business was 80 per cent now it is 40 per cent export and 60
per cent retail.

But not all manufacturers have the capital to invest in innovative strategies such as vertical
operations or retailing. Another more recent study on technical progress in 2009, shows that
small to medium manufacturers are slow to adopt higher levels of technology and training
(Jajri and Ismail, 2009: 207). SMEs in this instance resort to squeezing labour to solve their
problems. Chinese family businesses dominate the garment and textile industry and the
strengths of these businesses lie much more in cost cutting and service delivery than in
innovation (Tidd and Brocklehurst, 1999: 249). Although the company employs the discourse
of quality, such quality is achieved by careful training, tight control over the labour process
and the use of piece rates payment. The factory is organised according to the principles of
13

scientific management and there is no attempt to improve on quality by using employee
involvement schemes (Smakman, 2003). Indeed, some manufacturers admitted that the
payment system encourages workers to get it right the first time.
The government has attempted to address these problems through the introduction of a
Human Resource Development Council (HRDC) in 1993. The HRDC has not been as
effective as it could have been because it did not plan the training courses that would benefit
manufacturing companies in different sectors. Instead it left it up to the factory managers to
make their own plans for training and, due to high levels of competition between
manufacturers, most employers do not communicate about industry plans or do
benchmarking. In addition, the council has no system to evaluate its effectiveness and there is
no gauge to measure whether the HRDC has improved either the quantity or the quality of
training in Malaysia’s industries (Tidd and Brocklehurst, 1999: 249). Rasiah’s 2009 study
also sees Malaysia at the crossroads during this post MFA period because of the high levels
of competition in the global industry and the government’s failure to co-ordinate the industry
as a whole to move to upgrade to higher levels of value adding.
According to most of the informants in the larger factories, in line with buyers’ demands
factories have to invest in upgrading and study productivity to survive:
The quality control we do ourselves. We have computerised machines and we do lean
manufacturing. For the last year we are slowly changing from our old method to the new “lean”
modular manufacturing method, so we have to rearrange the sewing production lines and put in
different groupings. At 8 o’clock in the morning they start the operations and by 9am they can see
the completed garments start coming out. They call it bundling system. We changed our sewing
machines to the latest models. We have hanging systems. We have laser cutting for embroidering
and we have industrial engineering teams – to study productivity (H T Leing 2007, pers. comm.
May).

Despite an increase in technological capabilities in most of the large to medium factories,
except for two small manufacturers the SMEs interviewed did not upgrade to the same extent
as did the large manufacturers.
By 2007 energy costs increased and cracks started to appear in the industry as factories
found it difficult to make a profit. In 2008 the global financial crisis caused havoc around the
world. According to the experts, everyone inside and outside the industry became nervous
(Khadmudin, 2010). Banks in Malaysia stopped lending money to companies in the garment
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and textile business and manufacturers found it difficult to raise loans and pay overdrafts. As
a consequence more factories closed or relocated, or the owners stopped manufacturing and
started a trading business. Garment industries in developing countries are tied to the global
economy and make up the production links at the periphery of the commodity chains. In
chain analysis there is a division of power and wealth between the core and the periphery –
while the core holds the power through design, marketing and retailing, the periphery is
dependent on the core for contracts (Gereffi et al., 2005). The garment industry in Malaysia is
situated at the periphery and is almost totally reliant on contracts from the US and Europe for
its survival and the decline in orders decreased production. In response to the decline in
exports, thousands of foreign workers were laid off and deported to their country of origin.
The government included the garment and textile industry in a package to protect Malaysian
manufacturers but this did little to ease the situation. Some said it was a case of ‘too little too
late’– others complained the government is less interested in the textile and garment industry
than it is in the electronic industry because of the Chinese monopoly of the clothing industry.
Another reason given is that the government is more interested in promoting the electronic
industry because this ‘modern’ industry fits in with a newly developed country. As one
manufacturer put it, “basically, we found that Malaysia government is not really focussed in
this industry. Because they treat this industry as a sunset industry, so they are more focus on
high tech industry” (B S Ng 2009, pers. comm., 21 November).
Interviews conducted in August 2009 highlighted low levels of confidence in the industry.
However, by September 2009 some factory managers were reporting a slight increase in their
current orders. These manufacturers were also concerned about replacing the foreign workers
laid off during the crisis. The global economic recession has caused what industry experts
call a ‘big shake up’ for the industry (Tan, 2010). During the recent GFC, three large
companies that were interviewed in 2006 closed their doors, another re-located, and there are
reports that another three are in trouble not to mention the number of SMEs struggling to
survive.

6.

The Future: New Directions the Regional Way

Malaysia has two main associations that play important roles mediating between the
government and the industry, especially in terms of supporting the government in writing up
trade agreements between Malaysia and other nations. The Malaysian Textile Manufacturers
Association (MTMA) and the Malaysian Knitting Manufacturers Association (MKMA) also
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play a key role in promoting both the industrial knitting cluster in Batu Pahat and the industry
in Malaysia. Some companies interviewed are members of both the MTMA and the MKMA.
The majority of members are Chinese businessmen and businesswomen. In 2003-5 the
MKMA had 162 member companies and the MTMA had 174 member companies. According
to the members’ directory in 2007-8, the numbers had reduced significantly and MTMA had
133 member companies and the MKMA had 134 member companies.
At present the Secretary of the MTMA and other leading industry specialists are trying to
find ways to upgrade the supply chain in Southeast Asia as a whole. Firstly, instead of
competing with low wage countries Malaysia and other ASEAN nations are hoping to service
niche markets. According to Hong, who is also Secretary General of the ASEAN Federation
of Textile Industries (AFTEX, 2009) “We have to keep in line with the social trends and
capture the Niche markets. Malaysia has got a lot of weak linkages in the upstream so we
need to sell ourselves as a region”. The notion is still in its infancy but it is perceived that
ASEAN garment association leaders will also work with the buyers to find out what regions
offer the best services: “The buyers will also have to have a change of mindset. Presently the
idea is being sold to New York buyers” (A. Hong 2009 pers. comm., 30 June).
The new Project’s objectives are to enhance and promote ASEAN’s image and reputation
as a reliable full package producer of quality garments and textiles. The industry people
perceive an alliance of ASEAN countries to complete orders from design to delivery to boost
the industry (AFTEX, 2009). According to one interviewee, fabrics can be sourced from
Indonesia, pattern designs organised in Malaysia and garments cut and made in Cambodia.
The new strategy whereby buyers use a website to source and place orders will aid in the
integration of suppliers in the region, using new and old supply chains and corridors. This
new program will offer global buyers a one-stop shop for a full range of products and
services. In other words SourceASEAN.com, means creating virtual vertical factories
throughout the region.
When asked about the success of the new directions, industry informants were quick to
add that they still had a few problems to contend with. Firstly, for SourceASEAN.com to be a
success it had to be sold to the buyers and to manufacturers in the ASEAN nations and this
may take considerable time. There are, however, many issues to contend with and while the
discourse of new direction is good in theory, in practice it may be very different as the design
aspect will be a problem. Designing fashion in Malaysia has a different meaning to designing
fashion in countries such as Australia, Canada, Europe, Japan and the US (Weller, 2008). In
the early 1990s Mytelka (1991: 130) warned about the difficulties of transferring the design
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processes and practices to the East Asian NICs because, unless the designers are close to the
market, they do not understand fashion trends. In other words it is hard to design garments
unless one understands the culture. The NICs were successful with fabric production and
fabric design but they did not design garments until much later. They were successful
because they mastered the knowledge intensive aspects of the global industry early in the
1980s and worked hand in hand with the designers and buyers from the West. They
developed their own brand of quality fabrics. During interviews, manufacturers confirmed
that brand name buyers specify that Malaysian manufacturers use Taiwanese fabrics.
Driven by economic necessity, Malaysia too is moving to the next level to manufacture for
brand names from a number of sites. SourceASEAN.com appears to be mimicking Hong
Kong, Korean and Taiwanese companies although its aim is to supply niche markets. NICs
companies, on the other hand, are supply chains for large retail buyers (Appelbaum, 2008).
Taiwanese companies such as Nien Hsing and Pou Chen/Yue Yuen (Nike’s principal
supplier) and Hong Kong companies such as Fang Bros, Luen Thai and TAL apparel are a
few examples of large Asian apparel and textile companies. These companies have backward
as well as forward linkages within their own companies and can supply buyers with
everything including design facilities. According to Appelbaum’s research, large buyers are
setting up offices near these company facilities in China where the designers can work with
the production managers in the factory (Appelbaum, 2008: 73).
This means, for example, that the brand name buyers such as Liz Claiborne move staff
from Hong Kong and New York offices to the Luen Thai supply chain factory in Dongguan.
This factory has a two million square foot facility, a three hundred room hotel and a
dormitory that houses four thousand workers (Appelbaum, 2008: 73-5). It also has a
production development centre. Designers, fabric consultants, production technicians, and
computer information-technicians work together to design garment for the next season.
Everything is done in the factory to save time. This trend cuts the costs and improves the
turn-around time between orders and deliveries. There is no valuable time lost and it seems
that for many large retail stores by moving all the production to China goods can roll off the
factory floor and go straight to the retail store (Appelbaum, 2008: 73). It is also a cost saving
strategy for the Brand name designers who can move all but the most important designers and
trend setters to China and dispense with the tedious back and forth communication, fabric and
design. It remains to be seen, however, if SourceASEAN.com will amount to anything in the
future. On the other hand, if SourceASEAN.com does take off, the power structures between
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the core and the periphery will change and put a more regional focus on full package
production which will include both upstream and downstream production and inputs.
Aside from SourceASEAN.com, Trade Associations are also excited about inter ASEAN
trade and ASEAN FTA trade with countries such as India. According to an industry expert
(past president of both the MTMA as well as the AFTEX group), ASEAN trade is also
growing – since the MFA expired the trade between countries within the region increased. It
was US$300 million in 2003 and it grew at double digit rates ranging between 19 per cent
and 27 per cent from 2003 to 2007 compared to growths in global textile and apparel exports
from the same countries of between 4 per cent and 12 per cent during the same period
(Setiaharja, 2009).
Trade leaders are excited about the new prospects of both inter ASEAN trade and a new
Free Trade Agreement (FTA) signed with India (MKMA, 2009). According to the agreement
with India, duties will be eliminated on various products including textiles. Trade between
India and ASEAN amounts to $40 billion each year and India has the potential market of 1.1
billion in population and ASEAN of 550 million. The size of the two combined will be much
larger than China, Japan and South Korea put together. According to everyone concerned this
means expanding consumer markets and more garment business for Malaysia.

7.

Conclusion

This paper has highlighted changes in the Malaysian garment industry starting with a brief
history of development and the quota system, the end of the MFA and the decline of the
industry after the GFC. Overall however, this case study of Malaysia has highlighted that the
industry is surviving but, as Rasiah (2009) argues, the industry may not be in a good position
to survive the high levels of global competition for very long. The survivors and the losers
can be divided into those who upgraded to higher levels of technology and servicing the high
end sportswear markets, and those who failed to introduce higher levels of technology to
sustain growth as costs rose against falling profit margins.
The industry strategies to deal with high levels of competition and labour shortages varied
from re-locating part of their production to Cambodia and other lesser developed countries, to
hiring foreign workers. Industrial upgrading and close buyer relationships were some of the
strategies employed by the large manufacturers to deal with the changes but, in some cases,
to little avail. The industry, however, is not giving in to the high levels of competition
without taking new innovative paths to solve their problems. A newly proposed strategy
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adopted by the trade associations to deal with increasing levels of global competition may
come to fruition in the near future depending on whether the concept can be sold to ASEAN
countries and to niche brand name buyers. In addition, new markets are opening up in the
Asia Pacific region and Malaysian manufacturers are hoping for some of the business.
The paper also questions the role of the state in providing a captive workforce for an
industry upgrading to higher levels of garment production. Both large and small factories
reconciled low paid workers against the introduction of higher levels of technology – some
out of necessity because their small business did not allow further capital to be injected into
the factory and others because they had little incentive to invest in industrial upgrading
preferring to hire foreign workers. On the other hand, even the factories that invested in new
technology and reduced the numbers of production workers still had to hire foreign workers
because the wages paid to local workers were not enough to attract workers away from other
employment options. In most cases the buyers in core countries are responsible for the
position of the manufacturers in developing countries because buyers offer prices that cannot
sustain higher wages while still making a profit. However, like the NICs who were forced
under the quota system to be first class fabric makers and outsource mediators, Malaysian
manufacturers will be forced to adopt new techniques and skills to meet the needs of high end
production markets and tight delivery deadlines or face ‘the sunset’.
Notes
1

In 2008, the government announced a reduction of import duty for thirty two lines on textiles and accessories
from a range of thirty to twenty per cent to ten to twenty per cent.
2
For this article, globalisation is understood as brought about by trade liberalisation and technology
developments which enable free movement of goods and capital. This process means that economic borders lose
boundaries and the manufacture of goods along supply chains moves across the globe.
3
Special thanks must go to Cheah T W, Rebecca Chiang, Andrew Hong and Datuk Y H Tan for their invaluable
information and assistance organising contacts and interviews and special thanks to the manufacturers who
participated in the research. The interview material reached saturation level after about ten interviews with the
directors and managers of large Chinese owned and operated factories.
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